RUS  ENG
Полная версия
ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2012, том 5, страницы 209–229 (Mi cgtm160)

Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited

Pierre  von Mouchea, Federico Quartierib

a Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
b Università IULM, Via Carlo Bo 1, Milano, Italy

Аннотация: We revisit and compare equilibrium uniqueness results for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies. In doing this we provide various useful and interesting results for which it is difficult to give appropriate reference in the literature. We also propose problems for future research.

Ключевые слова: Aggregative game, equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, Fisher–Hahn conditions, marginal reduction, marginal revenue condition, oligopoly.

Язык публикации: английский



© МИАН, 2024