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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2011, том 4, страницы 19–32 (Mi cgtm176)

Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals

G. Attanasia, A. García-Gallegobc, N. Georgantzísbcd, A. Montesanoe

a LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
b GLOBE, U. of Granada
c LEE, U. Jaume I of Castellón
d BELIS, U. of Istambul
e Bocconi University, Milan (Italy)

Аннотация: We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Ключевые слова: Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement.

Язык публикации: английский



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