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// Contributions to Game Theory and Management
// Архив
Contributions to Game Theory and Management,
2011
,
том 4,
страницы
19–32
(Mi cgtm176)
Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals
G. Attanasi
a
,
A. García-Gallego
bc
,
N. Georgantzís
bcd
,
A. Montesano
e
a
LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
b
GLOBE, U. of Granada
c
LEE, U. Jaume I of Castellón
d
BELIS, U. of Istambul
e
Bocconi University, Milan (Italy)
Аннотация:
We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.
Ключевые слова:
Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement.
Язык публикации:
английский
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