RUS  ENG
Полная версия
ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2015, том 8, страницы 164–175 (Mi cgtm264)

Эта публикация цитируется в 5 статьях

Evolutionary model of tax auditing

Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena A. Gubar

St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia

Аннотация: Tax audit is repeated process which occurs annually. Therefore, we consider a dynamic model of tax auditing in this work.
It is supposed that each taxpayer can declare his income less or equal to his true level of income after every tax period. To simplify the model it is also supposed that taxpayers have only two levels of income — low and high. The tax authority assumed to use some statistical information about taxpayers' evasions from the previous tax periods and to choose the probability of tax auditing in the current period depends on this information.
Every taxpayer has one of three possible risk-statuses (risk averse, risk neutral and risk preferred) and change it depending on the external conditions. As well as tax audit is a regular action then it can be modeled as an evolutionary process, which take into account a revision of taxpayers' statuses.
Several modifications of evolutionary dynamics were considered.

Ключевые слова: tax auditing, tax evasions, risk status, evolutionary games, imitation dynamics.

Язык публикации: английский



© МИАН, 2024