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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2019, том 12, страницы 151–158 (Mi cgtm341)

Эта публикация цитируется в 2 статьях

Stochastic $n$-person prisoner's dilemma: the time-consistency of core and Shapley value

Aleksandra L. Grinikh

St. Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia

Аннотация: A cooperative finite-stage dynamic $n$-person prisoner's dilemma is considered. The time-consistent subset of the core is proposed. The the Shapley value for the stochastic model of the $n$-person prisoner's dilemma is calculated in explicit form.

Ключевые слова: $n$-person prisoner's dilemma, coalition, dynamic game, core, Shapley value, time consistency.

Язык публикации: английский



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