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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2020, том 13, страницы 207–217 (Mi cgtm366)

Эта публикация цитируется в 1 статье

Nash bargaining solution as negotiation concept for resource allocation problem: analysis of experimental data

Nikolay A. Korgin, Vsevolod O. Korepanov

V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences, Profsoyuznaya st. 65, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation

Аннотация: Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution (Vetschera, 2018), we analyze data obtained during experimental resource allocation gaming with Yang-Hajek's mechanism from the class of proportional allocation mechanisms. Games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensus-ended games show more but subtle attraction to Nash bargaining solution behavior. We discuss how these decisions correspond with other types of behavior actively exhibited by participants of this experiments — so-called constant behavior and with the end of negotiation process in games.

Ключевые слова: resource allocation mechanisms, Nash implementation, Nash bargaining solution.

Язык публикации: английский



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