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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2022, том 15, страницы 303–310 (Mi cgtm431)

Эта публикация цитируется в 1 статье

Solution of the meeting time choice problem for $n$ persons

Vladimir V. Yashin

Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, Pushkinskaya ul., Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia

Аннотация: We consider a game-theoretic model of negotiations of n persons about a meeting time. The problem is to determine the time of the meeting, with the consensus of all players required to make a final decision. The solution is found by backward induction in the class of stationary strategies. Players' wins are represented by piecewise linear functions having one peak. An subgame perfect equilibrium for the problem in the case of $\delta \leqslant \frac{1}{2}$ is found in analytical form.

Ключевые слова: optimal timing, linear utility functions, sequential bargaining, Rubinstein bargaining model, subgame perfect equilibrium, stationary strategies, backward induction.

Язык публикации: английский

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22



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