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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2009, том 2, страницы 241–250 (Mi cgtm52)

Brand and Generic Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Monopoly with Two Brands

Anastasia F. Korolevaa, Nikolay A. Zenkevichb

a St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics, Universitetsky Avenue 35, Petrodvorets, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
b St. Petersburg State University, Graduate School of Management, Volkhovsky Per. 3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia

Аннотация: This paper considers a dynamic monopoly with two brands. It is an extension of the work "Brand and generic advertising strategies in a dynamic duopoly" (Bass, Krishnamurthy , Prasad, Sethi, 2005). A monopolist possessing two brands has to decide how to use both generic and brand advertising for each of his brands in order to maximize his profit. Thus, he needs a method or algorithm that he could use practically. This work offers such an algorithm. A multistage algorithm of a problem solution which is software-programmable have been developed. Symmetric case is analyzed as the example.

Ключевые слова: dynamic monopoly, brand advertising strategy, generic advertising strategy, profit maximization, the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, optimal control.

Язык публикации: английский



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