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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2009, том 2, страницы 355–362 (Mi cgtm62)

Analysing Plural Normative Interpretations in Social Interactions

Dawidson Razafimahatolotra, Emmanuel Picavet

Université Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France

Аннотация: In this study, we deal with the legitimate plurality of interpretations of a given normative system. Distinct individuals or organisations often favour divergent interpretations of the same enforced norms or principles. This plurality, we argue, does not make it impossible that norms or principles be considered effective. Indeed, their susceptibility to various interpretations might be viewed as a constituent of their ability to impose structure onto social interaction. In this article, we suggest that interpretative plurality can be thought of in terms of alternative systems of individual and coalitional power. Power, in turn, is modelled through the game-theoretic notion of an effectivity function. This can prove useful, it is argued, to describe the contrast between formal authority and real power in organisations, and to improve our understanding of how interpretative controversies might account for real-authority migration.

Ключевые слова: Authority, Effectivity function, Game Form, Interpretation, Pluralism, Power.

Язык публикации: английский



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