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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2010, том 3, страницы 192–219 (Mi cgtm86)

Fuzzy Conflict Games in Economics and Management: single objective fuzzy bi-matrix games

André A. Keller

Université de Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies, France, CLERSÉ, UMR 8019/ CNRS

Аннотация: In the real game situations, the possible values of parameters are imprecisely known to the experts, all data of the game are not exactly known to the players, and information is often lacking. Imprecision on the environment, preferences, payoffs and moves of other players, may be of different types, but not only the probabilistic type of the Bayesian games. In the probabilistic approaches of uncertainty, events or statements are assumed to be well defined. On the contrary, the Zadeh's fuzziness concept extends the imprecision or vagueness appreciations to that events and statements. The theory of fuzzy sets has been extensively applied to a variety of domains in soft computing, modeling and decision making. This contribution introduces these attractive techniques with numerical applications to economic single-objective bi-matrix games. The computations are carried out using the software $MATHEMATICA^\circledR 7.0.1$.

Ключевые слова: fuzzy logic game; fuzzy linear/quadratic programming problem; extension principle; function principle.

Язык публикации: английский



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