M. I. Geras'kin, A. G. Chkhartishvili, “Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2017, Issue 9,Pages <nobr>106

This article is cited in 9 papers

Control in Social Economic Systems

Game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market with nonlinear agent cost functions

M. I. Geras'kin^a, A. G. Chkhartishvili^b

^a Korolev Samara National Research University, Samara, Russia
^b Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Abstract: We construct oligopoly models for nonlinear cost functions of agents under reflexive information. We obtain conditions for Nash equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric agent information in Cournot and Stackelberg reaction models (in case of one or several leaders).

Keywords: oligopoly, nonlinear cost function, Nash equilibrium, Cournot reaction, Stackelberg reaction, information asymmetry.

Presented by the member of Editorial Board: D. A. Novikov

Received: 28.12.2015