Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents

We consider the problem of determining information equilibria in a triopoly market in the presence of a Stackelberg leader (leaders) taking into account the reflexive behavior of all market agents in the case of the same reflexion ranks for linear functions of demand and costs of agents. Models of reflexive games are formed, formulas for calculating information equilibria are derived, and conjectural variations are investigated. The description of the complete group of reflexive reasonings of three agents has made it possible to single out reflexive coalitions, i.e., groups of mentally similar agents, and show that such coalitions are profitable, since the highest payoffs are received by agents who put forward the same ideas about the strategies of the environing. The properties of conjectural variations (negativity and boundedness of the sum) are proved, which are inherent in any aggregative game in which the utility function is a combination of linear price and cost functions.