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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2013 Volume 6, Pages 8–23 (Mi cgtm106)

The Lexmax Rule for Bankruptcy Problems

Javier Arina, Juan M. Benito-Ostolazab

a Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, Basque Country University, L. Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
b Dpto. Economía, Universidad Pública de Navarra, Campus Arrosadia s/n, 31006 Pampona, Navarra, Spain

Abstract: This paper investigates the use of egalitarian criteria to select allocations in bankruptcy problems. In our work, we characterize the sets of Lorenz maximal elements for these problems. We show that the allocation selected by the Proportional Rule is the only allocation that belongs to all these Lorenz maximal sets. We prove that the Talmud Rule selects the lexicographic maximal element within a certain set. We introduce and analyze a new rule for bankruptcy problems that shares strong similarities with the Talmud Rule.

Keywords: Bankruptcy problems; Lorenz criterion; lexicographic criterion; Proportional Rule; Talmud Rule.

Language: English



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