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JOURNALS // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Archive

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2013 Volume 6, Pages 63–74 (Mi cgtm109)

This article is cited in 1 paper

Dynamic Models of Corruption in Hierarchical Control Systems

Andrey A. Chernushkin, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky, Anatoly B. Usov

Southern Federal University, Faculty of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Milchakova st. 8-a, Rostov-on-Don, 344090, Russia

Abstract: Dynamic game theoretic models of corruption in two- and three-level control systems as well as optimal control problems and their applications to the optimal exploitation of bioresources and water quality control are considered. Several model examples are investigated analytically.

Keywords: corruption, hierarchical control systems, dynamic Stackelberg games, optimal control.

Language: English



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