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JOURNALS // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Archive

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2007 Volume 1, Pages 177–188 (Mi cgtm12)

CDM Domino

Haruo Imaia, Jiro Akitab, Hidenori Niizawac

a Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida, Sakyo-Ku, Kyoto, Japan
b Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Aoba-Ku, Sendai, Japan
c School of Economics, University of Hyogo, Gakuen-Nishi-Machi, Nishi-Ku, Kobe, Japan

Abstract: Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a newly adopted scheme to give incentives to emission reduction projects in developing countries under Kyoto Protocol. We consider its implication under the demads for the products produced by firms engaging in CDM project are interrelated. In particular, we try to give examples where an adoption of a CDM project by one firm enhances the incentive of other firms to follow. What we found is that the condition for this to take place is rather stringent, indicating that the external push may be desirable for one to promote CDM activities in these situations.

Keywords: Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, related goods oligopoly, complements.

Language: English



© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2024