Pierre von Mouche, Federico Quartieri, “Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2012, Volume 5,Pages <nobr>209

Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited

Pierre von Mouche^a, Federico Quartieri^b

^a Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
^b Università IULM, Via Carlo Bo 1, Milano, Italy

Abstract: We revisit and compare equilibrium uniqueness results for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies. In doing this we provide various useful and interesting results for which it is difficult to give appropriate reference in the literature. We also propose problems for future research.

Keywords: Aggregative game, equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, Fisher–Hahn conditions, marginal reduction, marginal revenue condition, oligopoly.

Language: English