G. Attanasi, A. García-Gallego, N. Georgantzís, A. Montesano, “Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2011, Volume 4,Pages <nobr>19

Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals

G. Attanasi^a, A. García-Gallego^bc, N. Georgantzís^bcd, A. Montesano^e

^a LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
^b GLOBE, U. of Granada
^c LEE, U. Jaume I of Castellón
^d BELIS, U. of Istambul
^e Bocconi University, Milan (Italy)

Abstract: We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Keywords: Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement.

Language: English