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JOURNALS // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Archive

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2024 Volume 17, Pages 86–104 (Mi cgtm463)

Survey on $SEIRD$ epidemic models with different focuses

Xiuxiu Liu, Elena Gubar

St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, 7/9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia

Abstract: This study is a survey of several extended models based on $SEIRD$ epidemics. The main contribution of the review is a modification of the classical $SEIRD$ epidemic model, from single-layer to multi-layer to super-exposure, and from general vaccine to pre-emptive vaccine to two-stage evolutionary-epidemic model. Assuming the presence of two viruses in a population, simultaneous and non-simultaneous occurrence of the two viruses was compared; assuming super-exposure between multiple viruses, general and pre-emptive vaccines were compared; and assuming that individuals have decision-making power over vaccination, the effect of the basic number of infections on the evolutionary stabilisation strategy was investigated. A series of numerical experiments support the theoretical results obtained.

Keywords: evolutionary games, epidemics, eSS, preemptive vaccine.

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2024.08



© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2025