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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2024 Volume 17, Pages 117–124 (Mi cgtm465)

Agent games and agency games

Mikhail M. Lutsenko

Saint-Petersburg State University of Economics, 30-32, nab. kan. Griboedova, St. Petersburg, 191023, Russia

Abstract: Non-cooperative games are considered, in which the payoff functions of some players depend on the actions of only a part of the entire set of players. A method for constructing a non-cooperative game with a smaller number of players for games with a larger number of players is proposed. The participants of the new game will be administrators of coalitions of players, whose payoffs are not affected by the actions of other players from this coalition. Examples of creating coalitions, the capabilities of the administrator with a correctly assigned fee are listed. For special cases, it is possible to define mixed strategies of the administrator, consistent with mixed strategies of the players.

Keywords: non-cooperative game, equilibrium, coalition, reduction of game.

Language: English

DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu31.2024.10



© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2025