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JOURNALS // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Archive

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2010 Volume 3, Pages 171–181 (Mi cgtm84)

This article is cited in 1 paper

D. W. K. Yeung's Condition for the Coalitional Solution of the Game of Pollution Cost Reduction

Anna V. Iljinaa, Nadezhda V. Kozlovskayab

a St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Universitetski pr. 35, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
b St. Petersburg State University, Graduate School of Management, Volkhovsky per. 3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia

Abstract: In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members. Obtained solution is time consistent and satisfies the irrational-behavior-proofness condition.

Keywords: differential game, cooperative game, dynamic programming, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, Shapley value, Nash equilibrium, time-consistency, irrational-behavior-proofness condition.

Language: English



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