Abstract:
This article continues the authors' research into cooperation between public and private investors in a resource region. In contrast with previous works, an attempt is made here to take into account the institutional features of the process of forming the investment climate. For this, transaction costs are introduced into the model and a mechanism for breach-of-contract risk insurance is formed. In the Russian mineral resource complex, costs and risks of this kind can be very significant. This work aims to analyze the partnership mechanisms, taking into account these circumstances and using the game-theoretical Stackelberg model. Such mechanisms determine the economic policy of the government and play an important role in stimulating private investment. The model is formulated as a bilevel mathematical programming problem. Effective solution algorithms based on metaheuristics are developed. This makes possible the practical studying the properties of Stackelberg equilibrium on the real data. The equilibrium determine the design of the mechanism of economic policy making, fully meeting the interests of society. Illustr. 8, bibliogr. 21.