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JOURNALS // Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya // Archive

Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 2019 Volume 11, Issue 1, Pages 96–114 (Mi mgta232)

This article is cited in 2 papers

Dynamic models of private and public interests combining in promoting innovations

Gennady A. Ougolnitsky, Anatoly B. Usov

Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Southern Federal University

Abstract: The article is devoted to modeling the system of coordination of private and public interests in promoting innovations in the organization. Subjects of controls of two levels (supervisor, agents) are taken into account. The relations between subjects are hierarchical. The algorithms for constructing equilibria in the games of Germeyer $\Gamma_{1t}, \Gamma_{2t}$ and are indicated. In the study uses the method of qualitatively representative strategies. The results of a number of simulation experiments are given. An analysis of the results is given.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Stakelberg equilibrium, simulation, Germeier games, method of qualitatively representative strategies.

UDC: 519.86
BBK: 22.18

Received: 06.12.2018
Revised: 11.02.2019
Accepted: 20.03.2019



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