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JOURNALS // Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya // Archive

Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 2009 Volume 1, Issue 2, Pages 66–81 (Mi mgta9)

This article is cited in 27 papers

Multistage networking games with full information

Leon Petrosjan, Artem Sedakov

Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Saint-Peterburg State University

Abstract: Multistage networking games with full information are considered. The network structure which connects the players is defined at every time moment. We assume that each verge has a utility (the player's profit form the connection with another player), and players have a right to change network structure at every stage. The approach to define optimal players' behavior is proposed.

Keywords: network, networking games, utility, Shapley value, Nash equilibrium.

UDC: 519.837.2 + 519.834
BBK: 22.18


 English version:
Automation and Remote Control, 2014, 75:8, 1532–1540

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© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2024