Methods of solution of the game theoretic models of coordination of interests in the fishery regulation

Dynamic game-theoretic models for concordance of private and social interests of agents within the framework of the concept of sustainable development of the dynamic system controlled by them are investigated. Within the framework of this concept, the hierarchical control mechanisms — methods of adminstrative control and motivation — are formalized as solutions of hierarchical differential games with phase constraints reflecting the requirements for the state of the controlled dynamic system providing conditions for sustainable development. Administrative control involves the impact of the lead player (the subject of managing sustainable development) on the set of admissible slave controls (the subject of the impact on the controlled dynamic system), and the incentive — on his win function. Mechanisms of administrative and economic management are formalized as computer imitation scenarios. The dynamic models considered in the article are the development of the models for concordance of private and social interests proposed by Yu.B. Germeier and I.A. Vatel. Numerical calculations are carried out and a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these control mechanisms for the fishing model is fulfilled.