On the security of one authentication protocol for RFID technology

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have become popular for their powerful capability as wireless identification. Security and privacy threats also evolve with the progress of RFID technology. The standardization process is far from complete: many RFID systems do not satisfy all the modern security requirements, such as Tag and/or Reader provably secure authentication; privacy of the parties; confidentiality and integrity of additional transmitted data. The scientific research in the field of RFID authentication security is inadequately represented in the Russian-language specialized literature, and there are no standardized solutions based on Russian cryptographic algorithms; hence, the development of such protocols (which also takes into account technical characteristics of the system due to the limited capabilities of the technology) is an extremely urgent task.
The main result of the paper is the formalization of the authentication property as the exact security model $\mathsf{AUTH}^+$ in the provable security framework, as well as the security proof for the RFID authentication protocol developed in TC 26 in this model. It was shown that for the protocol in question the $\mathsf{AUTH}^+$ model can be decomposed into two disjoint ones: the $\mathsf{LOR2}$ model for the confidentiality and $\mathsf{AUTH}'$ model for estimating the hardness of breaking authenticity and/or integrity of the protocol. Each of the models can be further reduced to the basic model $\mathsf{sPRP}$ for the security estimation of the block cipher used in the protocol.