Detection of statistical side-channel leaks in encryption algorithms based on the ELMO emulator

An analysis of power consumption traces during the execution of the “Magma” and “Kuznechik” encryption algorithms was conducted using the ELMO emulator. Additionally, instructions exhibiting statistical power leakage were identified. The modeling of power consumption traces employed an implementation of the GOST R 34.12-2015 encryption algorithm ($n=64$ for “Magma” and $n=128$ for “Kuznechik”) in the Electronic Codebook mode, developed in the C language. Side-channel leaks related to processed data have been determined based on statistical $t$-tests. Using the ELMO emulator, processor instructions have been experimentally identified that demonstrate the significant difference between the average values of the two analyzed groups of traces: with a fixed input value and a random input value. Instructions with detected statistical leaks are of particular interest for subsequent differential or correlation attacks based on power analysis during the execution of the examined cryptographic algorithms.