Management of innovation implementation using various information structures

A two-level management system for the innovation implementation in organizations is studied, taking into account the conditions of their "life-ability". The main task of mathematical modeling of the coordination of private and public interests in innovation implementation models is determining the appropriate strategy for the promotion of innovations. The problem is considered in a hierarchical formulation. There is one top-level management entity (center) and several lower-level entities (agents). The center is responsible for the result of innovation implementation, and agents are directly involved in implementation. The center manages the innovation implementation using various information regulations. Agents promote innovations and they receive funds from the center. At the same time, agents bear personal expenses. Agents have their own private interest, namely, they are engaged in third-party activities, that also bring them income. These activities are not related to the innovation implementation. Algorithms for constructing solutions to Germeyer's games in motivation and compulsion are indicated. Numerical solutions are constructed using the method of qualitatively representative simulation scenarios. Simulation experiments were conducted, the analysis of the results obtained was given.