The dynamic cooperative game models of electricity consumption management taking into account opportunistic behavior

The problem of managing electricity consumption by enterprises is studied in a dynamic game-theoretic formulation. A two-level dynamic game-theoretic model of managing electricity consumption by enterprises is constructed and studied in a cooperative formulation, taking into account possible opportunistic behavior of agents. The proposed two-level model includes a leading controller (controlling body) and several followers (enterprise owners). The controller presents the agents with a feedback control mechanism, informing them how much the reported amount of electricity actually consumed by them will be reduced depending on the amount of the "kickback" they propose. The cooperative game is described in the form of Neumann – Morgenstern, Petrosyan – Zakkur and Gromova – Petrosyan characteristic functions, the values of which are calculated using simulation modeling. The Shapley value is constructed for these characteristic functions. A simulation study of the model was conducted and a comparative analysis of the obtained results was given, a number of meaningful conclusions were made, in particular, the conclusion that one of the effective ways to combat opportunistic behavior of agents in hierarchical systems can be to provide them with the opportunity to form coalitions with the leader.