Models of adaptation in dynamic contracts under stochastic uncertainty

This work synthesizes the ideas of organization systems control theory and contract theory in the case of stochastic uncertainty repeated in time. Results on optimal reward systems for different problems are systematized. New sufficient conditions are given for the optimality of lump-sum and compensative contracts under stochastic uncertainty. Dynamic models of principal’s and agents’ adaptation to the changes in the statistical characteristics of the environment are considered. A classification of dynamic (in a sense of decision taking process) models of reward is given. Contracts between shortsighted center and agents functioning under stochastic uncertainty are considered. Reaction to such uncertainity is, indeed, one of the most crucial functions of control organs, providing adaptivity of their subordinate structural elements. Perspective future venues of research are different methods of describing uncertainity influence on agents, studiyng conditions of contract modification between farsighted center and agents and “dissonance” analysis on complex multielement dynamic organization systems.