RUS  ENG
Full version
JOURNALS // Problemy Upravleniya

Probl. Upr., 2015, Issue 3, Pages 29–39 (Mi pu917)

Models of informational confrontation in mob control
D. A. Novikov

References

1. Novikov D. A., “Ierarkhicheskie modeli voennykh deistvii”, Upravlenie bolshimi sistemami, 37, 2012, 25–62  mathnet  elib
2. Gubanov D. A., Novikov D. A., Chkhartishvili A. G., Sotsialnye seti: modeli informatsionnogo vliyaniya, upravleniya i protivoborstva, Fizmatlit, M., 2010, 228 pp.
3. Gubanov D. A., Kalashnikov A. O., Novikov D. A., “Teoretiko-igrovye modeli informatsionnogo protivoborstva v sotsialnykh setyakh”, Upravlenie bolshimi sistemami, 31, 2010, 192–204  mathnet  elib
4. Breer V., Novikov D., “Models of Mob Control”, Automation and Remote Control, 74:12 (2013), 2143–2154  mathnet  crossref  mathscinet  isi
5. Breer V. V., “Modeli konformnogo povedeniya. Ch. 1. Ot filosofii k matematicheskim modelyam”, Problemy upravleniya, 2014, no. 1, 2–13  mathnet  elib
6. Granovetter M., “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior”, AJS, 83:6 (1978), 1420–1443
7. Breer V. V., Novikov D. A., Rogatkin A. D., “Stokhasticheskie modeli upravleniya tolpoi”, Upravlenie bolshimi sistemami, 52, 2014, 85–117  mathnet  elib
8. Novikov D., Chkhartishvili A., Reflexion and Control: Mathematical Models, CRC Press, Leiden, 2014, 298 pp.  zmath
9. Burke D., Towards a Game Theory Model of Information Warfare, BiblioScholar, N.-Y., 2012, 116 pp.
10. Miller D., Introduction to Collective Behavior and Collective Action, Waveland Press, Illinois, 2013, 592 pp.
11. Breer V., “A Game-theoretic Model of Non-anonymous Threshold Conformity Behavior”, Automation and Remote Control, 73:7 (2012), 1256–1264  mathnet  crossref  mathscinet  isi
12. Gubko M. V., Karavaev A. P., “Soglasovanie interesov v matrichnykh strukturakh upravleniya”, Avtomatika i telemekhanika, 2001, no. 10, 132–146  mathnet  mathscinet  zmath
13. Novikov D. A., Tsvetkov A. V., Mekhanizmy funktsionirovaniya organizatsionnykh sistem s raspredelennym kontrolem, IPU RAN, M., 2001, 118 pp.
14. Novikov D., Theory of Control in Organizations, Nova Science Publishers, N.-Y., 2013, 341 pp.
15. Novikov D. A., “Igry i seti”, Matematicheskaya teoriya igr i ee prilozheniya, 2:1 (2010), 107–124  mathnet  zmath  elib
16. Novikov D., “Cognitve Games: a Linear Impulse Model”, Automation and Remote Control, 71:10 (2010), 718–730  mathnet  crossref  zmath
17. Gubko M. V., Novikov D. A., Teoriya igr v upravlenii organizatsionnymi sistemami, SINTEG, M., 2002, 148 pp.
18. Myerson R., Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts–London, 2001, 600 pp.  mathscinet
19. Mulen E., Kooperativnoe prinyatie reshenii: aksiomy i modeli, Mir, M., 1991, 464 pp.  mathscinet
20. Iskakov M. B., “Ravnovesie v bezopasnykh strategiyakh”, Avtomatika i telemekhanika, 2005, no. 3, 139–153  mathnet  mathscinet  zmath  elib
21. Iskakov M. B., Iskakov A. B., “Ravnovesie, sderzhivaemoe kontrugrozami, i slozhnoe ravnovesie v bezopasnykh strategiyakh”, Upravlenie bolshimi sistemami, 51, 2014, 130–157  mathnet  elib
22. Iskakov M., Iskakov A., Equilibrium in secure strategies, CORE Discussion Paper/61, CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2012, 38 pp.
23. Germeier Yu., Non-antagonistic Games, D. Reidel Pub. Co., Dordrecht–Boston, 1986, 327 pp.  mathscinet
24. Batov A. V., Breer V. V., Novikov D. A., Rogatkin A. D., “Mikro- i makromodeli sotsialnykh setei. Ch. 2. Identifikatsiya i imitatsionnye eksperimenty”, Problemy upravleniya, 2014, no. 6, 45–51  mathnet  elib


© Steklov Math. Inst. of RAS, 2025