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ЖУРНАЛЫ // Contributions to Game Theory and Management // Архив

Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2014, том 7, страницы 8–16 (Mi cgtm215)

On monotonicity of the SM-nucleolus and the $\alpha$-nucleolus

Sergey V. Britvin, Svetlana I. Tarashnina

St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia

Аннотация: In this paper two single-valued solution concepts of a TU-game with a finite set of players, the SM-nucleolus and the $\alpha$-nucleolus, are considered. Based on the procedure of finding lexicographical minimum, there was proposed an algorithm allowing to calculate the SM-nucleolus as well as the prenucleolus. This algorithm is modified to calculate the $\alpha$-nucleolus for any fixed $\alpha \in [0,1]$. Using this algorithm the monotonicity properties of the SM-nucleolus and the $\alpha$-nucleolus are studied by means of counterexamples.

Ключевые слова: cooperative TU-game, solution concept, aggregate and coalitional monotonicity, the SM-nucleolus, the $\alpha$-nucleolus.

Язык публикации: английский



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