A New Class of Problems in the Calculus of Variations

This paper investigates an infinite-horizon problem in the one-dimensional calculus of variations, arising from the Ramsey model of endogeneous economic growth. Following Chichilnisky, we introduce an additional term, which models concern for the well-being of future generations. We show that there are no optimal solutions, but that there are equilibrium strateges, i.e. Nash equilibria of the leader-follower game between successive generations. To solve the problem, we approximate the Chichilnisky criterion by a biexponential criterion, we characterize its equilibria by a pair of coupled differential equations of HJB type, and we go to the limit. We find all the equilibrium strategies for the Chichilnisky criterion. The mathematical analysis is difficult because one has to solve an implicit differential equation in the sense of Thom. Our analysis extends earlier work by Ekeland and Lazrak.